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be true in all cases, it surely is a factor which must be taken into consideration when quizzing villagers about the medical care they are receiving.

The refugees' fear of bombing points out the need for more information about it (why it is necessary, etc.) The film on the PLAF will partially fill the bill, but not completely. If we decide to go ahead with the booklet for village-level communicators, this is a question which might will be addressed.

Pradit feels there is no real understanding among the refugees of what the PLG plans to do with them. This, of course, is a partial reflection of the general uncertainty facing the entire Kingdom in the future. Nevertheless, it is a point which might well be discussed with Bounthanaly and Noun-phang.

In his initial effort at conducting a survey of this sort, I feel that Pradit did an excellent job. With more experience (and more time to gather the data), Pradit should be able to gain insights, based on conditions in the field, which will be of value throughout the mission.

A SURVEY OF THE ATTITUDE OF THE REFUGEES RECENTLY ARRIVED FROM THE PLAIN OF JARS

Thirty refugees, 10 women and 20 men, from various refugee resettlements were picked out for the interview. The statistics shown in the report may not be hundred percent accurate for time and circumstances did not permit the investigators to get as much information as they wanted to. The time spent for each refugee interviewed was short and it usually took some time in other conversations before we could come to the point where we could start working on the questionnaires. In order to get a thorough information and good statistics we must spend at least a week in each refugee center so that we would be able to gain some confidence from the refugees. The interaction between the respondents and the investigators usually took place amidst a crowd of refugees who not only liked to watch but also liked to help the interviewed in answering the questions. But it does not mean that this report is totally useless. It may help the authorities who are interested in the refugee program to have some knowledge of what the majority of the refugees feel and think and what was their background before they came to Vientiane plain. The results of the interview are as follows:

Age: The interview was conducted with the adults only. Though questions were simple the children could hardly give any information. The ages of the respondents were between 25-58 and eighty percent of the respondents were over 30 years old.

Sex: Of all the respondents interviewed 20 were men and 10 were women. Men were quite anxious to give answers in a great detail but women were reluctant to elaborate the answers.

Amount of Schooling: 4 out of 20 men had formal education prior to PL occupation but the women never had any education at all. These who had some education never went beyond 3rd grade.

Number of Children: 26 out of 30 respondents had children and about 60 percent of them had more than three children.

Where are their children? 20 percent of the children are with the PL, 5 percent joined with FAR and 75 percent are with the parents.

Number of times moved since leaving home: 80 percent of the refugees moved two times, 18 percent moved three times and only 2 percent moved one time before reaching Vientiane plain.

Amount of property and holdings at original home: All respondents owned land, cattle, buffalos, chicken and houses at original home. Each of the interviewed had more than 5 cattle or buffalos.

How much do you have now?: None.

Do you think you will ever regain as much as you once had?: All respondents thought they would never regain as much as they once had without the help of the Government. If they were sent back to their original home how they believed that they would not regain all the property except for the land. The house would have been destroyed by planes and the cattle would have been killed either by the PL or the FAR soldiers.

Did you ever live under the PL? All respondents did one time live under the PL, 95 percent of them lived under the PL more than 5 years.

Did you like it?: They all did not like to live under the PL.

Why?: They said the same thing that they were afraid of planes. Life was hard and dangerous. For many years they had to live in the trenches and never was a day when they were free from the plane attacks. They had to grow rice at night and were allowed to cook meals only in the morning. Whatever they grew they had to give 15 percent to the PL as a form of taxes. Life was rigorous and had no freedom. They had to attend several meetings though they did not want to. They had to carry supplies for the PL troop when they were called for and had to walk for many days with heavy load on the back. Their children over 13 years old were taken from them to places unknown and they never heard from their children since.

Do you know anyone currently serving in the PL army?: They actually did not see the people whom they knew serving the PL army but they heard that some people from their villages were now serving the PL.

Why did they join the PL?: They did not want to join the PL but they were taken by the PL when they were young. Since the PL took the children from the villages they never heard from them again. But they were told the children were now studying in schools.

Have you ever been to Vientiane city or plain prior to moving this time? One out of 30 used to come to Vientiane city but it was about 20 years ago. The rest never had a chance to come to this area.

Do you have any relatives or friends on the Vientiane plain?: They all said NO.

Why did you leave the Plain of Jars?: They all said the Government asked them to move. The Government told them that there would be more fighting in the Plain of Jars and it would be safer for them to move to Vientiane plain where there was peace. They were fed up with the fighting and bombs. They would like to live in a place where it was peaceful. So they listened to the Government and moved to Vientiane plain.

Did you feel any pressure to leave?: They did not feel any pressure to leave the Plain of Jars. They were now taken care of by the Government. Whatever the Government said it must be true.

Are all of your former friends with you now?: 28 out of 30 respondents said all of their former friends were with them. The other two respondents said not all of their former friends were with them, some families were still in Samtheng and Long Tiang.

What percentage of the people in your home village are in this settlement?: About 96 percent.

Who is Ho Chi Minh?: 16 out of 30 heard about him, that he was a Vietnamese leader in North Viet-Nam.

Who is Mao Tse Tung?: 13 out of 30 respondents heard about him, that he was a leader in China.

Who is Souvanna Phouma?: 18 out of 30 said he was the Government.

Who is Tiao Saykham?: 21 out of 30 said he was the Chao Khoueng.

Who is your Chon Muong?: Only one out of 30 respondents knew who he was.

What province are you in now?: 26 out of

30 respondents said they were in Vientiane area.

What Muong are you in now? Only 3 out of 30 respondents knew the name of the Muong in which they live. The rest knew only the name of the village in which the resettlements were located.

Did you ever meet a FAR soldier?: They all met a FAR soldier just when and before they moved to the Plain of Jars.

What did you like best about him?: The FAR soldier was good, he helped them to be able to come out from the PL.

What did you like least about him?: None said nothing against him. But they mentioned that they saw their cattle being taken by the FAR soldiers.

When did you last meet a RIG civilian official before moving from the Plain of Jars?: They met a RIG civilian official when they arrived in the Plain of Jars.

What did they do?: They helped them to find place to stay and gave them food.

How far is it to the Plain of Jars from here?: They all said it was very far.

Do you think it is possible for you to return?: They all depended on the Government. If the Government wanted them to go back they would do so.

Do you want to return?: 8 out of 30 respondents wanted to return if there was peace at home. The rest depended on the Government's decision to decide their future.

Have you ever seen a North Vietnamese soldier?: They all saw Vietnamese soldiers at their original homes.

What did he do?: They did not do anything. They came to the village with PL soldiers.

What would you do if he came to live in this village?: They did not know what to do. It was up to the Government.

Do you have a radio?: 2 out of 30 respondents had radios.

What station did you listen to?: Long Tiang Radio station, Lao National Radio Station and Thai station.

What was the last program you listened to?: Lao and Thai modern songs. Mohlam. (While they were with the PL they were not allowed to listen to news and commentary).

What is your favourite program?: Lao and Thai modern songs and Mohlam.

Do you listen to the news on the radio?: While they are here they used to listen to the news. But under the PL they were not allowed to listen to the news and commentary.

From what source do you receive most of your information?: They received information the meetings arranged by the PL and word of mouth.

Can you read?: 6 out of 30 respondents could read but not very well.

When did you last read a newspaper or magazine?: When they were with the PL. The Chinese and Vietnamese newspapers and magazines in Lao were available for the villagers to read.

SURVEY OF REFUGEES FROM THE PLAIN OF JARS—No. 3

In the past week our three interviewers have talked with 97 refugees. Most of them are now living in the Ban Na Sou-Ban Xon area (site 272). The majority are from Muang Hlem in Luang Prabang Province and Muang Son, Hua Panh (Sam Neua). Some are Xieng Khouang Lao from Muang Kham (around Ban Ban) who are now living at Ban That, near Phone Hong. And a few are Meo whose original homes were southwest of Muang Sen in North Vietnam, in the tip that protrudes into Laos just off Route 7; after leaving North Vietnam they had moved to Muang Mok (site 46) and then to their current home at Ban Than Peup (TF 7693). The same factors that limited the report on the Plain of Jars refugees—lack of time, bad weather conditions, the interviewers' lack of experience—hampered this operation.

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too. Nevertheless, it gives some notion of what the people interviewed have experienced and are thinking about. Some findings:

(1) Type of people interviewed:

The male-female ratio was 60 percent vs. 40 percent.

Seventy percent of the people interviewed had never attended school.

Seventy-three percent were ordinary villagers, not holding any position in the village hierarchy.

Eighteen percent were *Nai Bans*.

Ninety-two of the 97 were married, and 88 of the 92 had children.

Seventy-nine percent of those with offspring said their children were still with them, and of the children who had left home, 15 percent are now with the Pathet Lao and 6 percent with the RLG.

(2) The largest group, 22%, left their homes in 1967, 19% in 1969, 15% in 1966. Since leaving their homes, 41% have moved twice, 28% three times, and 13% only once.

(3) 50% of the people said they left their homes because they did not like the Pathet Lao, 28% because they feared bombing, and 22% because they wanted to be away from the war and when the government troops came they went with them.

(4) 79% said the areas in which their original homes are located were controlled by the Lao-Viet while they were there. The interviewees from Sam Neua had been with the communists since 1953, for they were caught up in the resistance movement against the French.

(5) The interviewers could get only 22 people to respond favorably about their experiences with the Pathet Lao. Of the 81 who answered the question "What did you like best about living under the Pathet Lao?", 59 (73%) said they did not like anything. The lack of favorable comment on the Lao-Viet may be attributed in part to fear of reprisal. However, the fact that the same interviewers got many favorable reactions from the PDJ refugees about their experience with the Lao-Viet suggests that the 97 people interviewed this time do have some genuine feelings of dislike for the communists. A partial explanation may be found in the terrorism employed by the Vietnamese troops when first introduced into Laos in large numbers in 1963. Another factor, of course, is that most of the people spoken with are not settled and seem reasonably happy with their new homes. (54% said the land they are now on is as good as, or better than, the land at their original homes. A few of those from Sam Neua spoke wistfully about the profits from growing opium "back home." But they conceded that the land around site 272 is better than their previous holding for high-land rice.)

Of the many undesirable aspects of life under the Pathet Lao mentioned, the highest number (48 of 133 items) centered around forced portage. Following that was taxation (33). The other 52 negative responses fell into six categories.

(6) 25% of the respondents said they first saw bombs dropped near their villages in 1964 and a higher percentage (37%) had heard of bombs being dropped on other villages in that year. 69% said they had seen bombs dropped frequently (48 out of 70). 60% said they hid in the woods during bombing attacks.

(7) 25% (24 of 97) had seen people killed by bombing, although only one had witnessed the death of over seven people. The majority of those who had seen people killed (58%) had seen two or more deaths (29% had seen two and an equal number had seen three).

(8) 69% said there were PL troops in the area being bombed, although only 18% had seen enemy troops killed by air attack. A slightly higher percentage, (24%) had heard of enemy casualties being caused by bombing.

(9) 82 people said the bombing made life

very difficult for them—80% of this group saying they could not eke out more than a bare subsistence living after the attacks started. A point of some interest here is that only 7% said they feared death by bombing.

(10) 57% of the respondents said they had seen T-28s bombing and 40% mentioned having seen jets. 49 of 92 (53%) said they thought the bombing was done by Americans; 30% listed the RLG as the responsible party; and 17% said they did not know who was doing it.

(11) Although 28% of the respondents said they had left their homes due to fear of bombing, 23% said they would return home if it were stopped. But 98% of all respondents said they would not return to their homes even if the planes stopped bombing, as long as the PL were still there. Reasons given were fear of continued war, dislike of the communists, and satisfaction with their present situation.

A BILL TO CORRECT AN INJUSTICE TO SOME CITIZENS OF THE MIDDLE RIO GRANDE CONSERVANCY DISTRICT IN NEW MEXICO

HON. MANUEL LUJAN, JR.

OF NEW MEXICO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, May 20, 1971

Mr. LUJAN. Mr. Speaker, today I am introducing a bill to correct an injustice to some of the citizens of the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District in my congressional district.

In the summer of 1966, the board of directors of this conservancy district were informed by the Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Department of Interior, that the Bureau intended to offer for public sale certain small tracts of land which had been considered privately owned by the State of New Mexico and the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District at the time of its formation in 1927. On many of these tracts private citizens have been assessed for taxes for many years and the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District had, since its formation, levied assessments against their property. The records of the District, on its organization in the middle twenties, including the maps which were prepared, identified practically all of these tracts as privately owned. The private parties occupying the land also believed that they owned the land and sold and traded the same.

Because of existing legislation, the Bureau of Land Management cannot convey title directly to the people now occupying the land. But the district, as a political subdivision of the State, can acquire this property under a congressional act as a conduit for the title to the individual property owners. The bill includes the sum of \$5,626,450 to pay for the administrative work involved and it would be paid by the property owners themselves. Any substantial charge would be a bitter pill for the various landowners or occupants of this land to swallow when they believed they have owned this land all these years.

Therefore, I recommend that this bill be given early consideration and that these citizens be allowed to have clear title to the land they have always believed was theirs.

THE MEN IN THE MIDDLE

HON. G. WILLIAM WHITEHURST

OF VIRGINIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, May 20, 1971

Mr. WHITEHURST. Mr. Speaker, at ceremonies observing Peace Officers' Memorial Day, held in my district at city hall in Norfolk, Va., last May 15, I was privileged to speak to the assembled members of the Norfolk police force.

Peace Officers' Memorial Day provides an opportunity for the public to reflect on contributions of and attitudes toward law enforcement personnel, and for the public's defenders to look at their past to guide a course for their future.

Law enforcement is a complex and demanding occupation, requiring a professional approach. The remarks I made may be of interest to my colleagues and those interested in the duties of a peace officer. I include the text of the speech at this point in the RECORD:

REMARKS OF THE HONORABLE G. WILLIAM WHITEHURST, PEACE OFFICERS' MEMORIAL DAY

August Vollmer, former Chief of Police of Berkeley, California, once said:

"The citizen expects police officers to have the wisdom of Solomon, the courage of David, the strength of Samson, the patience of Job, the leadership of Moses, the kindness of the Good Samaritan, the strategic training of Alexander, the faith of Daniel, the diplomacy of Lincoln, the tolerance of the Carpenter of Nazareth, and finally, an intimate knowledge of every branch of the natural, biological, and social sciences. If he had all of these, he might be a good policeman."

Of course, there is no such person either within or outside of police departments. On the other hand, I contend that with the turbulent mood of the nation today, in most cases policemen are acting with extraordinary kindness, humaneness, and understanding.

I would cite the recent days of "anti-war protests" in our nation's capital, led by Chicago Seven defendant Rennie Davis.

While apprehension was felt on the part of many residents of the Capital and its suburbs concerning what might transpire between the young people and the police, a massive mobilization of officialdom handled the potential threats skillfully and peacefully for the most part, outmaneuvering and outguessing the young protesters with a minimum of violence.

I realize that there are many problems in our society today, and I have always believed that young people can contribute in a positive way toward indicating weaknesses in the system. In fact, we need the young and enthusiastic outlook of the college student to help us acquire the proper perspective. During my 18 years as a college professor and Dean of Students at Old Dominion, I stressed to students that they had every right to petition their government and make their views known. From my experience with the students, I know that they are a thoughtful group for the most part and are capable of incisive perceptions. But I always cautioned these students that they must do their petitioning through legitimate channels to be effective.

However, those in Washington, calling themselves the Mayday Tribe, chose to disrupt traffic in hopes of shutting down the capital city of our country. They actively and indiscriminately slashed tires, ripped out wiring in cars, and carried cars into intersections, in hopes of stopping traffic.

Park benches were rolled over steep embankments to stop the flow of traffic on roads

A treasury study and report should be undertaken to determine the degree of enforcement and compliance with Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code. Under this provision, the IRS has the authority to require corporations to attribute their income to the specific foreign subsidiary where the income was earned. Its purpose is to prevent corporations from allocating their foreign income among various subsidiaries so as to pay the minimum possible taxes.

Wherever corporations with global accounting systems are found to be not in compliance with Section 482, they should be given a reasonable period of time for compliance, but compliance should be made mandatory in all instances.

The amount of write-offs, under U.S. tax laws, of depreciation presently allowed to U.S. corporations, for their foreign subsidiaries, should be replaced by a sliding scale allowance which relates to the tools, technology and purpose of the facility. If, for example, 100% of the capital assets (machinery, etc.) in the foreign subsidiary was developed at the expense of the U.S. government and the U.S. taxpayer, the depreciation allowed would be zero. However, if the production of the foreign subsidiary serves a great social purpose and has no adverse impact on U.S. trade, then the depreciation allowance could be the maximum.

A tax should be imposed on the value of any patents, licenses and technology that are exported. Further, a tax should be levied on the royalties received by U.S. companies.

Items of the Tariff Schedule which help to transfer production abroad should be repealed. As an example, item 807 and item 808.80 are an open invitation to U.S. multinational firms to use low-wage foreign labor to assemble products outside the U.S. and then ship them back to the U.S. at a specially low tariff rate. Both of these items should be repealed because they have spurred the export of production and jobs.

2. Supervise and curb outflows of U.S. Capital.

Clear legislative direction is necessary to give the President authority to regulate, supervise and curb the outflows of U.S. capital. At the present time, controls on foreign investment are loose, inadequate and not related to trade and production. Authority within the President's hands should include considerations for the kind of investment that would be made abroad, the product involved, the country where the investment would be made, the linkage of the investment to the flow of trade and its effect on U.S. employment and the national economy.

We object to the AID legislation now before Congress which turns over to multilateral agencies, such as the World Bank, the supervision of private investment abroad for AID purposes.

In addition, there is a strong need for a report on enforcement of 22 USCA 2370 (d) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. This provision in the law was aimed at keeping development loans from disrupting U.S. production. It requires that not more than 20% of production in a foreign factory created by a development loan may be exported to the U.S. to compete with U.S.-made products. To date there has been no disclosure as to the operation—or effectiveness—of this provision.

Similarly, the reports of the Export-Import Bank should include a yearly review of the impact its loans are having on U.S. exports, imports and the national economy.

3. Supervise and Curb Export of Technology.

U.S. government policy has encouraged the export of technology in recent years. U.S. companies have been licensing production to foreign licensees and patentees who produce behind foreign trade barriers for export to the U.S.

This policy should be reversed by giving

the President clear authority to regulate, supervise and curb licensing and patent agreements on the basis of Congressionally determined standards. These would include, the kind of investment, the product involved, the country of investment, the linkage to trade flows from such transfers and the effect on U.S. employment and the economy.

4. International Fair Labor Standards.

Reports should be made to the U.S. government (Labor Department) on foreign wages paid by the military and U.S. business. These reports should be on the same basis that U.S. law now requires reporting on wages, hours, etc. within the U.S. Only by this means can data be acquired that gives a perspective of labor factors in these U.S. foreign operations.

The State Department and other U.S. agencies should press for international fair labor standards in trade agreements.

5. Quantitative Restraints.

It should be the expressed policy of the United States to recognize that the healthy expansion of the world economy is linked to the continuation of a diversified, productive and fully employed economic and social system here, as well as abroad. To assure this policy, mechanisms should be established to avoid the continued displacement of U.S. production, tax-base erosion, market disruption and export of American jobs.

Quantitative restraints, with a base year of 1965-69, should be applied to products and parts of products imported into the United States, allowing for a flexible growth factor related to U.S. production of the item. Exceptions to such quantitative quotas could be:

(a) where a legitimate voluntary agreement now exists or is negotiated on the item with other supplying countries; and

(b) where the failure to import the item would disrupt U.S. production and U.S. markets.

A review of the operations of such restraint mechanism should be made after one year to determine the degree of effectiveness in achieving the above stated objectives.

To carry out this program, a single agency with quasi-independent authority to serve the Congress should be established. This agency would determine the quantitative limitations based on the criteria established, advise the Congress of necessary interim adjustments for items where data are not available, and supervise the maintenance of the program. Because of the broad spectrum of its operation, the agency should be composed of the merged operations of the Tariff Commission with the necessary trade-related parts of the Commerce, Labor and Treasury Departments.

6. Truth in Labelling.

Products should be clearly labeled to show the country of origin for components and parts as well as the final product. For example, a TV set made from parts produced and assembled in Taiwan, Hong Kong, U.S. and Korea should show the source of the components as well as the final product. The current law places labelling within the discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury and, as now functioning, does not give the consumer truthful evidence of where the product, or its parts originated.

Similarly, advertising of imported products should include references to the country of origin of the products and components.

7. Consumer Protection Enforcement.

All imports should conform strictly to all laws designed to protect the safety and health of American consumers.

8. International Accounting.

Federal standards for international accounting by U.S. firms with foreign operations should be established and enforced. Such accounting standards should be consistent with the uniform accounting required by Section 718 of the Defense Production Act of 1950.

Under current law Customs officials classify imports under general categories related to

the collection of tariffs rather than to the actual description of the imported product. Census and Customs Bureaus should have consistent reporting systems so that imports can be related to production in the United States. The Tariff law should be amended so that shipping declarations and invoices include product descriptions.

9. Escape Clause and Dumping.

The Antidumping Act of 1921 must be modernized to assure effective action against dumping. Under current operations, dumping findings have taken as much as two years. Interpretations of the law have not made clear that employment and working conditions should be part of the test of injury to an industry. The law should shorten the period of a finding of sales at less than fair value (dumping) to 4 months, make the injury determination simultaneous with the determination of sales at less than fair value, and place the determinations within the single agency established to supervise international trade.

The escape clause of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 has been interpreted to make findings of injury almost impossible. This provision allows the United States government to raise tariffs or impose quotas when a finding of injury is made by the United States government. The new agency should replace the Tariff Commission and much easier tests of injury should be available. These tests should include labor effects, such as underemployment, loss of fringes and wage effects.

Not all provisions of the Tariff and Trade laws grant standing to sue to employees and their representatives. Thus, in an investigation where multinational corporations are involved, the "U.S. industry" is the only party which is allowed to bring suit. In the escape clause, however, employees are permitted to bring suit. There should be a consistent provision throughout U.S. trade and tariff laws providing that workers in the United States have legal standing to bring suit concerning injury.

 CONGRESS NEEDS TO KNOW

Mr. CASE, Mr. President, yesterday's vote on whether Congress should reduce American troops in Europe dramatically brought before the country the question of the division of responsibility in foreign policy between the President and Congress.

Although I have long supported the effort to define and reassert the role of Congress in this area, today I want to discuss the need for information if Congress is to participate with any real meaning in the formulation of foreign policy.

Everyone agrees that Congress cannot effectively carry out its functions if it does not know what is going on. And often Congress does not know what is going on, because information, particularly in the foreign-affairs field, is withheld from us.

A recent case in point is the use of Thai troops in Laos.

On April 17, I read an article in the Christian Science Monitor that asserted our Government had reached an agreement with the Government of Thailand for a sharp increase in Thai troops to be used in Laos. The article went on to say that the United States had agreed to provide the financial backing to support these Thai troops.

I am a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, and I realized that the committee had not been informed about

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any agreement of this sort. Thus, I wrote a letter to the Secretary of State in an effort to find out what was happening. I asked him if the report were true, and, if it were:

First. Does the administration consider the financial support of Thai troops in Laos to be in violation of the Cooper-Church provision which bans the payment of mercenaries in Laos, except to protect a safe and orderly American withdrawal or disengagement from Southeast Asia or to aid in the release of American prisoners?

Second. Does the administration intend to submit the agreement with Thailand to the Senate as a treaty?

Third. What are the specific terms of the agreement?

Fourth. How is the administration planning to pay for the agreement?

Fifth. Has the U.S. Government made any assurances to the Thai Government of U.S. support in event the Thai troops in Laos encounter difficulties?

If my questions seem to presume that there really is such an agreement, I can only say that George Ashworth who wrote the article is a competent journalist. What is more, I was able to ascertain, on an absolutely not for quotation basis, from Government sources that there are 4,000 to 6,000 Thai troops in Laos and the U.S. Government, through CIA, is paying for them. And finally, although I place almost no faith in Radio Hanoi's credibility, I was aware of broadcasts by that station which discussed the presence of Thai troops in Laos.

My perhaps plaintive question is: Should a U.S. Senator who is a member of the Foreign Relations Committee have to learn of important agreements our Government has made by reading the newspapers, by talking privately with Government officials who do not wish to be quoted, and by listening to foreign radio broadcasts?

I will remind you that the Constitution grants the Senate the power to give its advice and consent to treaties entered into by the United States. Well, there might be those who argue this pact with the Thais is not a treaty, but an executive agreement. The Constitution does not mention executive agreements, which were instituted early in our history as a means of handling minor and routine matters with foreign governments. Certainly nothing of a major nature was meant to be excluded from the treaty-making process. I find hard to believe that the framers of the Constitution would not have considered as a treaty an agreement which calls for the potential expenditure of tens of millions of dollars and which might lead our country into a serious military involvement if we ever had to bail out the Thais.

Moreover, the Congress has the sole constitutional authority to appropriate funds. These are presumably Government funds being paid to Thailand. But Congress has never directly voted to pay Thai troops in Laos. The money comes out of that vast treasure chest, which Congress has appropriated, but never controlled, for discretionary military and intelligence purposes.

I strongly believe that Congress should

control this money. Certainly we should know how it is being spent.

But let me continue with my story.

A few days before the May 3 appearance of the Acting Secretary of State, John Irwin, at a Foreign Relations Committee hearing, I was informed that the State Department did not wish to discuss this question of Thai troops in Laos. I felt that both the Congress and the American people had a right to know and this was a matter that should be discussed.

So I asked Acting Secretary Irwin what was happening in Laos. Mr. Irwin replied:

Any discussion of the Thai troops would be proper for an Executive Session.

An executive session occurs, of course, when the committee meets with an administration official on a confidential basis with the press and public excluded. I accept that certain matters are sensitive and should be dealt with in private. But in this case, I was not so sure.

I further asked Mr. Irwin:

Is it not something that the North Vietnamese know about? We are not surprising them. We are not keeping anything from the enemy in this matter. What is the reason for not disclosing it to the American people, who are paying for it, if indeed they are?

Mr. Irwin replied:

Well, if I may, sir, I would still prefer to defer it to Executive Session.

While I still have not received a reply to my letter, I am sure that at some future time an administration representative will sit down with the Foreign Relations Committee behind locked doors and inform us how and why the United States is paying for Thai troops in Laos. But this will be months after the fact, and we shall undoubtedly be told about an ongoing program which would be difficult to stop even if we were so inclined.

I would like to cite a statement made by the Secretary of State only last Friday before the Foreign Relations Committee:

There needs to be effective consultation between Congress and the President, and we have tried to follow this policy. It is not only Congress that is weakened by a lack of consultation. Our nation's foreign policy is itself weakened when it does not reflect continuing interaction and consultation between the two branches.

I can only say that I agree wholeheartedly with the Secretary of State on this question. But I would add another dimension: Our Nation's foreign policy is weakened when it does not reflect consultation and interaction with the American people.

If an action by our country cannot stand up to public exposure, then our leaders should seriously reconsider that action.

I am not advocating that the negotiation of agreements with foreign governments should be conducted in the newspapers. Obviously, there is a need for secrecy while negotiations are still underway. But Congress and the people should be informed before our country is indelibly committed to a position.

The Secretary of State also said last Friday:

The essence of presidential power is the

ability to enlist public support for national policy, and in this the President needs the cooperation of Congress.

Again I am in agreement. Yet how can cooperation exist between the President and Congress if the Congress does not know the facts?

I reiterate that Congress has the constitutional right and duty to know about matters such as the recent agreement with Thailand to finance and support Thai troops fighting in Laos. This is an apparent widening of American involvement in Southeast Asia, and the administration should have consulted with us before embarking on a new policy.

And unless there were extraordinary reasons—and I can think of none—the American people also should have been informed. For the people must be the ultimate arbiter of the course our Nation follows.

I ask unanimous consent that my letter to the Secretary of State of April 23, 1971, and George Ashworth's April 17 article in the Christian Science Monitor be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

U.S. SENATE,
Washington, D.C., April 23, 1971.

HON. WILLIAM F. ROGERS,
Department of State,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am enclosing from the April 17 Christian Science Monitor George Ashworth's article which reports that the Administration has reached an agreement with the Government of Thailand for a sharp increase in Thai troops to be used in Laos. Mr. Ashworth notes that the United States Government has reportedly agreed to provide the financial backing to support the Thai troops.

I would appreciate it if you could comment on the accuracy of what Mr. Ashworth has written and then, assuming his information is correct, answer the following questions:

1. Does the Administration consider the financial support of Thai troops in Laos to be in accord with the Cooper-Church provisions in the 1970 Defense Appropriations Act which bans the payment of mercenaries except to protect a safe and orderly American withdrawal or disengagement from Southeast Asia or to aid in the release of United States prisoners.
2. Does the Administration intend to submit the agreement with Thailand to the Senate as a treaty?
3. What are the specific terms of the United States agreement with the Thai Government including the cost to the United States Government and the agreement's duration?
4. Does the Administration intend to request supplemental appropriations to pay the costs of agreement or will existing funds be reprogrammed?
5. Has the United States Government made any assurances to the Thai Government of United States support in event Thai troops in Laos encounter difficulties?

Sincerely,

CLIFFORD P. CASE,
U.S. Senator.

THAI FORCE IN LAOS: UNITED STATES TO FINANCE FOREIGN TROOPS

(By George W. Ashworth)

WASHINGTON.—Nixon-administration officials have hammered out an agreement with the Government of Thailand for sharply increased use of Thai forces in Laos.

The American Government has reportedly agreed to provide the financial backing nec-

May 20, 1971

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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

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essary for Thai troops to help bolster the South Vietnamese-United States position in Laos.

Officially, neither the North Vietnamese nor the Americans are involved in Laos. However, both sides are heavily involved in fact and have been for years. The North Vietnamese have provided the backbone needed by the Pathet Lao for their insurgency. And the Americans, largely through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), have advised and paid for much of the war effort, particularly around the Plain of Jars.

Thai troops are known to have been in Laos for six or seven years. But until late last year, the number was relatively small. This time last year, there were perhaps 1,000 Thais fighting on the South Vietnamese-American side in Laos.

Now, the U.S. is providing most of the financial backing for a force in Laos of between 4,000 and 6,000 Thais, according to unofficial estimates.

OPEN-ENDED AGREEMENT?

According to sources, the agreement between the U.S. and Thailand on the use of Thai troops in Laos is open-ended. As one official put it, "The Thais are ready to send in just about as many troops as we are willing to pay for."

The Pentagon refuses to discuss Thai involvement in Laos. Queried, a Pentagon spokesman suggested that the Thais were the only persons who could provide details.

One reporter in the field, Tammy Arbuckle, reported in January in the Washington Star that Thai forces were alleged to have operated in northeastern Thailand with other troops in an attempt to cut Route 7, Hanoi's major supply route to the critical Plain of Jars. The attempt failed.

Mr. Arbuckle also reported a 155-mm. howitzer battery overrun near Muong Soui had been removed to the greater safety of the allied base area at Long Chien and provided protection by Thai infantrymen. Other Thai troops have been operating in parts of Laos near the Thai border.

Thai manpower has been increased substantially since Mr. Arbuckle reported from the field, according to sources here. The buildup apparently began as soon as the Thais were assured of U.S. financial backing.

MATTER CLOSELY HELD

Although the Thai involvement is a very closely held matter, particularly in the Pentagon, some outside the defense establishment are aware of some details of the new move. Sources report a growing concern among some in the government that the Thai involvement in Laos may soon become too expensive to be absorbed within regular defense expenditures.

Although the cleanest way to handle the matter, at least in financial terms, would be a request to Congress for a supplemental appropriation, such a request almost surely would be a hot political matter. For the moment, the costs are being absorbed with increased difficulty.

There appear to be several reasons for the increased Thai involvement:

Most importantly, perhaps, the Thais were willing to help in Laos if most of the bill were picked up. For several reasons the Thai Government considers the insurgency in Laos a matter of substantial concern. And concerns have not been eased by the Chinese construction of a road from Dien Bien Phu across Laos toward Thailand. The insurgency of Thailand is now a quite serious matter.

In some respects, the tide seems to have tipped against the Royal Lao side in the continuing fighting. Until 1969, the fighting between the neutralist forces and the Pathet Lao backed by Hanoi had been an ebb-and-flow sort of warfare with territory changing hands in a fairly regular pattern depending upon the seasons. Then, in 1969, Gen. Vang

Pao and his Meo troops, with heavy American air backing, pushed strongly against the Communists on the plain, capturing large numbers of supplies and causing heavy enemy casualties. The Communist response was to press back harder than before, and the pressure has continued.

The Nixon administration undoubtedly would like to see the neutralist regime in Laos survive. This is seen as important both for the non-Communist factions in Laos and for the other beleaguered nations in Indo-China.

Given the nature of the conflict in Laos, congressional views, and the presidential determination to pursue the Nixon doctrine, the use of regular American troops in Laos was unthinkable.

IMPROVING RECREATION FOR THE 1-DAY VISITOR IN THE NATIONAL FORESTS

Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, the outdoor recreation opportunities encompassed by the national forest system are among the greatest natural heritages available for us by the American public.

The national forest system is extremely diverse. The resources and characteristics include almost every significant type of vegetation, climate, topography, soil, geology, and other natural feature found within the borders of the United States and Puerto Rico.

Specific recreation opportunities of many kinds in the national forests are well-known to millions of Americans. Some have found virtually a "home-away-from-home" at some favorite campground, ski lodge, or other facility or area. Others have explored the back country while hunting big game or traveling through wilderness areas. And every year new millions experience their first recreational use of the national forests.

The 1-day visitor and his family usually come to the national forests in their automobile. Frequently they are on a scenic drive through the forest. They stop at the turnouts and overlooks, get out of a hot, sticky car, read the signs, if there are any; and stand and gaze about them—usually with no place to sit, contemplate, and enjoy the serenity of the oceans of green that stretch before them.

They then pile back into the car and move on to the next stop where they repeat this performance. When they return home they can say that they saw a lot of scenery, but their encounter with the forest environment was minimal, impersonal, and shallow. Yet, there is a great need for the day-use national forest visitor to learn of man's and nature's interaction within the forest environment.

It is my opinion that the day-use visitor comes to the national forests in anticipation of a new, different, and special experience, and yet he is probably not very receptive to the lessons of nature and her forest lands. He does not know what to look for, or how to enrich his experience.

The Forest Service has a strong obligation to show this day-use visitor the fascinating natural and human history that occurs on these forests, and to invite him to become more knowledgeable of the natural environment and his rela-

tionship to it. The Forest Service has the obligation to enrich this visitor's forest experience.

There is one job we do not have to do—create natural attractions to the forest. Nature has already done that for us. All we need to do is make it possible for the day visitor to understand and enjoy these great gifts out there on the national forests of which every American is part owner. Now, how do we do it?

We need to call to the attention of the day visitor, in compelling ways, the natural, human, and cultural history connected with the land and forest resources he is viewing. In my own State of New Hampshire, the Kancamagus Highway slices through some of the most scenic country on the White Mountain National Forest. At one stop the Forest Service has restored the historic George House. Why? Because through the interpretive story presented at the George House, the Forest Service has been able to recreate for the visitor how the early day New Englander lived in that isolated back country.

There are hundreds of opportunities on the 154 national forests of the Nation to do something for the visitor who cannot stay long, but who nonetheless, is interested in the people who occupied the land and made our country great.

I can envision a well-planned 10-year construction program aimed at better understanding of nature's environment for the day visitor to the national forests. Much of this would be in the form of upgrading and updating existing facilities. Likewise, much of it would be new construction.

Here are some of the national forest opportunities that present themselves:

Building, renovating, expanding, and updating turnouts and overlooks.

Building benches with shade shelters for people to rest on and contemplate.

Constructing short nature trails—10-minute trails, for example, at turnouts.

Placing some benches at appropriate places on the trail for the elderly, handicapped, and the very young to rest on.

Building information stations at strategic entrance points to the national forests—manned and unmanned with modest orientation and interpretive exhibits for the day visitor.

More carefully laid out—designed, planned—auto tours both conducted and self-guiding.

Innovating and trying self-guiding auto tours with audio tapes.

Building more short loop return trails in existing long nature trails.

Where feasible, considering the addition of sanitary facilities and drinking water.

Filling the tremendous need for the construction of new quality interpretive signs and the renovation of older ones.

Then there is the question of visitor safety. In many places there will be need to construct ingress and egress traffic lanes. Also, taking many existing roads—upgrading them a little, and with unmanned interpretive media, creating out of them outstanding wood and experiences for the day visitor.

The Forest Service has always been conscious of the needs of the day visitor, and has done what it could for him.

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However, the pressing problems of coping with the pyramiding pressure exerted on the national forests by its ever-increasing army of recreation visitors, and its poorly equipped recreation budget, has delayed these needed projects.

As a citizen of New Hampshire, this disturbs me. But as an American, it disturbs me even more. The White Mountain National Forest has the following projects which need developing so that this forest can be fully enjoyed:

White Mountain National Forest Projects	
Route U.S. 3: Complete 15-unit Black Brook Picnic Ground on Route 3 in Franconia	\$20,000
Kancamagus Highway:	
Expand and remodel Conway Ranger District office to include visitor information section	83,600
Improve Mount Osceola Tower as a feature in the scenic drive backdrop (low priority)	10,000
Bear Notch Road (connects with Kancamagus): Complete "Chocoma View" overlook (Parking, barriers and interpretive signs)	6,000
Route U.S. 302:	
Improve parking turnouts and road end, turn around on Zealand Road. This gravel road is a popular scenic spur off 302	8,000
Build Sawyer River Picnic ground (so units) and eliminate adjacent (1 mile) Sawyer Rock Picnic ground which is ecologically worn out and too close to road improvements	40,000
Route 113: Build picnic ground (4 units) and complete 21-unit campground at new Basin Pond Recreation area	35,000
North-South Road (Between Rt. 25 & 112): Improve parking, picnic (6 units) and boat launching facilities at Long Pond	35,000
Route 118—Sawyer Highway: Provide tables (6 units), toilet facilities, interpretive signing and parking at Jackman Brook Overlook	10,000
Route 110: Improve picnic facilities (grates) and construct dam to improve swimming and boating at South Pond Recreation Area	24,000
Route 16: Improve picnic (4 units) and interpretive facilities and entrance road at Glen Ellis Scenic Area	20,000
Tripoli Road—Waterville: Develop Small 6-unit picnic ground	10,000
Mad River Road: Improve Campton Pond Picnic Ground—new toilets, tables and grates	25,000
Route 112: Replace substandard toilets at Wildwood Picnic Ground	6,000
Wild River Road: Install unmanned VIS stop—located in Maine but serving New Hampshire scenic drive	2,000
Total	334,600

Nationwide, the Forest Service has 790 projects at a cost of \$750,000 which could be developed during fiscal year 1972. In addition, they have a 10-year development program calling for an annual expenditure of \$1.5 million per year to develop approximately 9,000 sites for the day visitor. Despite this need, with its pitifully inadequate recreation budget, because of very serious problems elsewhere in the vast national forest system, the Forest Service is not going to be

able to program a single dime in fiscal year 1972 for the development of facilities for the day-use visitor.

I believe this is shirking our responsibility to millions of Americans. How much longer can we continue to do so. How many more American families are going to be denied the opportunity to "see the forest behind the trees" and how it relates to him and his family.

Mr. President, I want to announce now that at the proper time I will move to provide the funds for this program which I believe is so important to the full utilization and enjoyment of the national forests which is one of our greatest natural resources.

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS SUPPORTS EXECUTIVE REORGANIZATION AND SPECIAL REVENUE-SHARING PROPOSALS

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, on May 12, 1971, the board of directors of the National Association of Manufacturers resolved in favor of the President's major departmental reorganization, and special revenue-sharing proposals. The National Association of Manufacturers is to be commended for its support of these measures. They recognize that increasing the efficiency and improving management of the Federal Government are important national objectives deserving quick congressional consideration. I am pleased in this regard that the chairman of the Government Operations Committee, the distinguished senior Senator from Arkansas (Mr. McCLELLAN) has called for hearings to open in the full committee on May 25 and 26, at which time the committee will hear a group of distinguished witnesses and begin its work on these important bills.

I ask unanimous consent that the resolution referred to above be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the resolution was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Resolved that the National Association of Manufacturers commends the Administration's efforts to increase efficiency and improve the management of the public sector and urges the public and the appropriate committees of the Congress to give prompt attention to the several proposals for reorganizing the Executive Branch and for Special Revenue Sharing. The first group of proposals would, in our view, improve public sector performance at the Federal level. The second group would provide an important vehicle for strengthening state and local governments by increasing their ability and responsibility for determining priorities for Government spending in their jurisdictions. Approved by the Board of Directors May 12, 1971.

THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY GALA CELEBRATION OF THE MOTION PICTURE AND TELEVISION RELIEF FUND

Mr. TUNNEY. Mr. President, on the evening of Sunday, June 13, a rather remarkable event will take place in and around the three theaters making up the magnificent complex known as the Los Angeles Music Center. Officially, it

will be known as the 50th Anniversary Gala Celebration of the Motion Picture and Television Relief Fund. Actually, it will be an outpouring of those unique people in our midst—show people—in support of their own.

Show people have always taken care of their own. In years gone by that hat was passed. Today the hat is represented by a sprawling, expanding Motion Picture Country House and Hospital flourishing among the crest of the Santa Monica Mountains, supported in its entirety by those unique people—show people.

These same people today are in the throes of raising \$1,000,000 in a single night to help overcome a deficit brought about by the twin forces of rising unemployment and increasing hospitalization and medical costs. The hat is being passed again—a very flossy and talented hat. An actor named Gregory Peck has turned producer—at no salary, of course—in order to stage a show starring the likes of Pearl Bailey, Jack Benny, The 5th Dimension, Mitzi Gaynor, Bob Hope, Danny Kaye, Bobby Sherman, Frank Sinatra, Barbara Streisand, and many other stars. At no salary, of course.

The show is being directed by Vincente Minnelli. Design is being done by Harry Horner and lighting by H. R. Poindexter. Music is being provided by Nelson Riddle and David Rose. Herb Alpert and Jerry Moss are providing dance music for the outdoor party that follows the show. No salary.

All this under the chairmanship of Walter Mirisch, along with Jack L. Warner, George Bagnall, Roy Disney, Donald Crisp, Mary Pickford and Dr. Jules Stein, aided and abetted—if, indeed, not actively prodded—by four indefatigable women: Rosalind Russell, Anne Douglas, Veronique Peck and Ruth Berle.

And coming home, as it were, to lend her own unique helping hand as patroness and guest of honor will be Her Serene Highness, Princess Grace of Monaco.

There are literally thousands of other people involved in this undertaking. They refer to themselves as "the industry." And they are the only industry, not only in the United States but in the entire world, with a well-organized, funded, time-proved plan to take care of their own.

They are faced with a problem and they are solving it. They are not bringing the problem to Washington. They are not asking for Federal funds or State funds or matching funds or any funds other than those to be dug out of their own pockets.

Frankly, I find this both admirable and refreshing. I would hope that other industries in this great country of ours might take heed.

CHARLES CONNAUGHTON RETIRES AS REGIONAL FORESTER

Mr. PACKWOOD. Mr. President, I have had word this week that Charles Connaughton, who has served with such great distinction as regional forester at the headquarters in Portland for the past

U.S. SAID TO PAY THAIS AIDING LAOS

Fulbright Says Financing of
4,800 Violates the Law

By JOHN W. FINNEY

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON May 21—

Senator J. W. Fulbright said today that 4,800 Thai troops, financed by the United States, were fighting in Laos in support of the Royal Laotian Government.

Mr. Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, suggested that such support by Thai troops in Laos was "inconsistent with the spirit" of the "antimercenary" amendment that had been incorporated in the Defense appropriations bill at his suggestion.

The amendment provided that none of the defense funds could be used "to support Vietnamese or other free-world forces in actions designed to provide military support and assistance to the Government of Cambodia or Laos."

Among other aims, this provision was specifically designed to prevent the introduction of American-financed Thai troops into Laos or Cambodia.

But as part of the compromise leading to House and Administration acceptance of the Fulbright "antimercenary" amendment, a clause was included specifying that the amendment would not "prohibit support of actions required to insure the safe and orderly withdrawal or disengagement of United States forces from Southeast Asia or to aid in the release of Americans held as prisoners of war."

The State Department refused to confirm or deny the figure of 4,800. But its spokesman, Robert J. McCloskey, said the department had informed Senator Fulbright, an Arkansas Democrat, and Senator Clifford P. Case of New Jersey, a Republican member of the committee, that American support of Thai troops in Laos did not violate the "antimercenary" amendment.

There have been recurring reports of Thai battalions fighting the Communists in Laos, particularly in the north in support of an irregular army of mountain tribesmen financed by the Central Intelligence Agency.

However, Mr. Fulbright offered the first authoritative estimate of the size of the Thai contingent. He made his statement after the Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Foreign Commitments, headed by Senator Stuart Symington, Democrat of Missouri, had received a secret briefing from two committee staff members, James G. Lowenstein and Richard M. Moose, who recently returned from a 10-day inspection trip to Laos.

The State Department sent letters yesterday to Senators Case and Fulbright that clearly indicated that the Thai participation in the war in Laos was being supported financially by the Central Intelligence Agency.

Letters Classified Secret

The letters, responding to questions by the Senators about reports of Thai troops in Laos, were classified secret, and the State Department and the Senators therefore refused to make the texts public.

But department officials said that the letters had declared that the costs of supporting the Thai troops did not come within the State Department's jurisdiction, thus clearly pointing to the C.I.A. as the agency providing financial support.

The letters, department officials said, contended that financial support for Thai troops in Laos did not violate the "antimercenary" amendment.

The executive branch could argue — although the State Department did not in the letters — that the use of Thai troops in northern Laos was related to the withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam and thus permissible under the Fulbright amendment.

But the Administration would be somewhat handicapped in advancing such an argument because of a statement made last month by William H. Sullivan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, before the Senate Refugee Subcommittee headed by Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Democrat of Massachusetts.

In his prepared testimony, Mr. Sullivan said that the "other war" in northern Laos "has nothing to do with military operations in South Vietnam or Cambodia."

Alternatively, the Administration could argue that the "antimercenary" amendment applied only to Defense Department appropriations and not to funds provided to the C.I.A.

In protesting yesterday on the Senate floor against the financing of Thai troops in Laos without the knowledge or approval of Congress, Mr. Case observed that "the money comes out of that vast treasure chest, which Congress has appropriated but never controlled for discretionary military and intelligence purposes."

The agreement to provide financial support to the Thai troops apparently predates enactment of the Fulbright amendment last December.

According to reports from Vientiane, the Laotian administrative capital, the Thai battalions were first introduced about a year ago when the C.I.A.-supported army of mountain tribesmen, commanded by Maj. Gen. Vang Pao, was under severe pressure from the Communist forces.

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Case Says U.S. Secretly Pays Costs of Thai Troops in Laos

By Murrey Marder
Washington Post Staff Writer

The United States is secretly paying "through CIA" for the costs of "four to six thousand Thai troops in Laos" without any direct action by Congress, Sen. Clifford P. Case (R-N.J.) said yesterday.

Case called on the administration for "the specific terms of the agreement," which he said he first read about in the press last month. "Congress has never directly voted a penny to pay Thai troops in Laos," said Case, and both Congress and the public have "a right to know" what is happening.

Thailand has denied having any troops in Laos; its officials

have said only that there may be Thai "volunteers" or "ethnic Thais" serving in Laos. U.S. officials have been publicly silent on the subject, except to refer back to the elliptical Thai statements.

Case finally got a reply yesterday to a letter he sent on April 23 to the State Department—but he said the reply was marked secret.

The substance of the reply to Case, according to State Department spokesman Charles W. Bray, was that "nothing is being done that is not within present legislative authority." Bray said the subject had been discussed in closed session with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, of which Case is a member, and State could discuss the matter further only in the same manner.

Case said last night that "I'm still not satisfied . . . We should have been advised before the thing started, rather than having it dribble out afterwards in a way in which we can do little more than wring our hands."

The senator said that as he recalls, the subject of Thai units in Laos was only "touched on" by Central Intelligence Agency director Richard Helms, in a closed meeting.

After reading press accounts last month about a new U.S.-Thai agreement "for a sharp increase in Thai troops to be used in Laos," said Case, he made his own inquiries.

"I was able to ascertain," said Case, "on an absolutely not for quotation basis, from government sources that there

are four to six thousand Thai troops in Laos and the U.S. government, through CIA, is paying for them."

Case said that "If an action by our country cannot stand up to public exposure, then our leaders should seriously reconsider that action."

His letter to Secretary of State William P. Rogers asked if financial support for Thai troops in Laos violated a congressional ban on payment of mercenaries in Laos except to aid American troop withdrawals or aid in release of U.S. prisoners; the terms of the Thai agreement, and whether the United States agreed to provide support "in event the Thai troops in Laos encounter difficulties."

~~SECRET~~ *LOS*

THE NEW YORK TIMES

DATE *Feb. 11* PAGE *16*

Americans in South Vietnam Attribute the Setback in Laos to Faulty Planning and Intelligence

By IVER PETERSON
Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, March 29—United States Army advisers and other observers in the field are ascribing the South Vietnamese Army's performance in Laos to difficulties the allies had failed to anticipate and to tactical challenges it had not been trained to meet.

American officers in the field point out that despite the South Vietnamese commanders' insistence that their tactics were mobile, their supply, troop-lift and artillery-support system required them to establish bases that fixed them—however temporary—in static positions that the enemy soon began to harass and attack.

Along with the burden of manpower required to protect the bases, the Communists added the important psychological burden of forcing the South Vietnamese onto the defensive almost from the start in terrain they had supposedly gone to conquer.

Moreover, according to American tacticians, little in the South Vietnamese Army's experience and training had prepared it for fighting the pitched battles against equal and often superior forces.

In South Vietnam the allied tactic has been to use ground troops to flush out the small enemy bands that operate there and then pull the foot soldiers back so that withering air and artillery fire could be poured in.

In the Laotian panhandle the North Vietnamese outnumbered the Government troops by better than 3 to 2, and the effectiveness of air support was greatly reduced by the mountainous terrain, frequent spells of poor visibility and the difficulty the American pilots had in communicating with the South Vietnamese.

The American advisers also report that the Communists pressed their numerical advantage fiercely. Instead of melting away on contact, they engaged the South Vietnamese in close combat and, as one American officer put it, hugged their positions closely enough to avoid allied bombing and shelling.

The accidental United States bombings of South Vietnamese positions in Laos—there were at least five—were seen as the inevitable result of the fighter-bomber pilots' attempts to drive off the tenacious North Vietnamese.

Both American and South Vietnamese officers have also conceded that poor planning and a lack of intelligence coordination contributed to the South Vietnamese problems. They confessed early that they had not allowed for the enemy's use of tanks, against which antipersonnel rockets fired from rockets were ineffective.

The lack of sound intelligence about the enemy's movements and assets was compounded, the American advisers say, by the traditional rivalries between the South Vietnamese infantry, ranger, marine and airborne units, which often failed to share what they knew.

A United States helicopter commander at Khesanh, the rear base, said, "The airborne at Hill 31 never told anyone back here that the enemy was

using tanks until one of our forward air controllers flew over and saw them. By the time the jets came on station, it was too late—the tanks were already on top of the airborne's bunkers."

The magnitude of the enemy's antiaircraft firepower also caught the allies by surprise. While United States commanders tried at first to put a good face on the situation, they soon began to hint that the 600 helicopters assigned to the operation could not keep up with the heavy workload and the devastating, interlock-

ing enemy system of antiaircraft artillery, heavy machine guns and small arms.

Indeed, rumors circulated among American helicopter pilots that the operation had been curtailed in part because the American command decided that the loss of aircraft and the strain on those still flying had become too great.

The helicopter problem was intensified, allied officers say, by the failure of three armored battalions and three airborne battalions to fulfill their mission of keeping Route 9 open from the border to the opera-

tional area. If they had done so, the officers believe, surface transportation might have taken some of the strain off the helicopters and, more important, permitted resupply of the task force during bad weather.

As it is, commanders of the South Vietnamese armored forces refused to say just what their men and machines did in Laos, except for a small tank force sent into action too late to be of use on Hill 31, one of the hotly contested strong-points.

Another problem faced by

the South Vietnamese was the uncertainty of the mission. Neither the South Vietnamese nor the American command ever declared what the objectives were, except in the general terms—disrupting traffic on the Ho Chi Minh Trail and destroying enemy supplies. At the outset the American advisers stressed that the program was tentative with each phase depending on the success of the preceding one.

Whatever Saigon officials' ultimate hopes for the operation, it appears clear that they had more in mind than a drive

into Laos, a brief occupation of the eastern edge of the trail and then withdrawal.

American officers and observers in the field also believe that the South Vietnamese soldiers were not eager for the fight and that their leadership, which has long been cited as the principal obstacles to successful Vietnamization, was uninspired and often incompetent.

American helicopter pilots reported frequent instances of South Vietnamese officers abandoning or failing to control their men. One reason the troops often broke ranks under

fire and ran for the helicopters, the pilots said, was that their officers had already left. But it often happened, some pilots pointed out, that the officers were among the first to die in battle.

Most public knowledge of the operation concerns only a few thousand of the over 20,000 troops involved. A Government military spokesman here said recently that 15 or 16 of the battalions did not engage the enemy in significant numbers.

As for the four to six battalions that did get into heavy

fighting, the spokesman added, all of them retreated under hot pursuit.

President Nixon said last Monday of the Government troops in Laos: "Some of their units have not done so well, but 18 out of the 22 battalions, as General Abrams has pointed out, are doing extremely well and he says will come out with greater confidence and greater morale than before."

Presumably the battalions praised by the President were those that, according to the Government spokesman here, did no heavy fighting.

Last Laotian Stronghold on Plateau Is Said to Fall

VIENTIANE, Laos, May 19 (Agence France - Presse)—The town of Houei Kong, the last stronghold of Government forces on the Boloven Plateau, reportedly fell to enemy forces today.

This development marked the third major defeat for Laotian troops in the country's southern panhandle. The plateau town of Paksong fell to the enemy on Sunday, and Dong Hene, about 115 miles to the northwest, fell yesterday.

According to first reports, the battle for Houei Kong was short. The town has an airstrip and a civilian population regroupment center run by Americans.

Also based there was a 1,500-man garrison, which was said to be under the control of the United States Central Intelligence Agency.

Meanwhile, the Government reported the reoccupation of a deserted enemy position in northern Laos 12 miles north of the royal capital at Luang Prabang. The position, at Paksong, had been held by enemy forces since March 20.

Ashau Battle Reported

SAIGON, South Vietnam, May 19 (UPI)—Thousands of South

Vietnamese troops moving in the Ashau Valley reportedly fought a six-hour battle today with large enemy forces entrenched there.

Reports from a base near the valley, which has long been a major North Vietnamese infiltration corridor from nearby Laos into the northern quarter of South Vietnam, said an American helicopter was shot

down and two other helicopters and a reconnaissance plane were damaged by intensive ground fire.

Military sources at the base were quoted as having said that a United States fighter-bomber destroyed an emplacement of heavy machine guns.

Initial battle reports were said to list 14 enemy soldiers killed and four South Vietnamese marines wounded.

Lieut. Col. Nguyen Quang commander of the Third Regiment of the South Vietnamese First Infantry Division, said at a command post six miles southeast of the valley: "We expect a lot more fighting in the next few days. Our men are fighting well and our morale is good."

The Government troops reportedly were flown to positions in the mountains surrounding the valley on Sunday to begin their long-delayed sweep to clear the enemy stronghold. Clearing the valley is the primary objective of the American-backed South Vietnamese operation, known as Lamson 720, which began in mid-April.



The New York Times May 20, 1971

Focus Display Capability To Hit Throughout Laos

By Murrey Marder
Washington Post Staff Writer

Communist forces in Laos are showing a capacity to strike at new and widely scattered points across the country, intensifying military pressure on the American-supported government.

In the last four days the North Vietnamese offensive has penetrated further westward than ever before, toward the Mekong River which forms the border between Laos and Thailand. Relatively small Communist troop units, about 120 air miles apart, are now in position to threaten—but not necessarily take—strategic points in the western sector of the Laotian panhandle, U.S. officials acknowledged yesterday.

Because the style of fighting in Laos is often to mount a threat for military or diplomatic purposes, and often both, the State Department yesterday labeled the situation "serious," rather than alarming.

The message that the Communist forces apparently intend to convey to Laotian Premier Souvanna Phouma, one U.S. source said, is "we can hit you from north to south."

There are divided opinions among Washington officials about the cause and effect relationship between the current Communist offensive in Laos and the U.S.-supported assault into Laos by South Vietnamese troops in February and March, called Operation Lam Son 719. The Communist and allied sides each claimed that operation was a success for itself and a defeat for the adversary.

Some U.S. officials contended yesterday that the current Communist attacks provide proof of the success of the February-March assault on the Ho Chi Minh infiltration trail network into South Vietnam, for it has forced the Communists to move westward to try to recoup the damage inflicted.

But other sources point out that it is Laos that is paying the penalty, with the Communist forces showing that they can recoup in the west for

damage done to them in the east—at the heavy expense of Laos and its protector, the United States.

North Vietnamese attacks, with elements of three regiments, on Tuesday overran the town of Dong Hene, near the western end of Highway 9. This was the road along which South Vietnamese forces attacked from the east earlier this year to interdict the North Vietnamese infiltration network. Communist troops are now within striking distance of the main east-west, north-south road junction in the western sector of the Laotian panhandle, Highway 9 and 13. Just beyond it is Savannakhet, a major town and base on the Mekong River.

Two days earlier, North Vietnamese troops to the south captured Paksong, the last remaining base of significance on the Bolovens Plateau, once dominated by guerrilla units financed and directed by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. From bases in this sector the guerrillas harassed and observed Communist troops and supplies moving down the Ho Chi Minh Trail network.

West of Paksong is Pakse, another major installation on the Mekong, and a headquarters for open and covert U.S. support for the official and clandestine Laotian forces and civilians.

U.S. sources yesterday said they regard it as unlikely that Communist troops will attempt to take Pakse. American officials reiterated that the Communist forces in Laos for years have held dominant military strength and a wide choice of targets if they chose to expend the resources to take them.

The current spring offensive in Laos is traditional for the Communists, between the end of the dry season and the start of the rainy season, U.S. officials noted. If the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao forces choose to risk a major test of

military strength, officials said, it could come at Long Cheng in the north, headquarters for the CIA-supported guerrilla army of Gen. Vang Pao.

The State Department officially confirmed yesterday that the United States has evacuated from Pakse to Vientiane 44 American women and children and 51 dependents of foreign employees of the United States and 17 nationals of friendly countries. Most of the Americans were dependents of Agency for International Development employees.

AID has been embarrassed by disclosures that its funds were used to assist Laos military and CIA-directed paramilitary units and their employees. Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) announced Sunday that AID had assured him that this AID funding will be terminated by July 1, with most of the funding already transferred to other U.S. agencies.

D.E. Ronk filed this report on the situation in Laos in a special dispatch to The Washington Post from Vientiane:

A major Communist offensive is unmistakably underway in Southern Laos, with scores of refugees swarming into this capital city last night. They filled hotel lobbies and restaurants, amidst nervous laughter, crying children, and small bundles of personal effects.

North Vietnamese troops are reported regrouping 25 miles east of Pakse, in Laos' panhandle, after successfully capturing control of the Bolovens Plateau in swift, coordinated attacks last weekend.

Monday night a meeting was held in Pakse and the senior American official called for evacuation of dependents as a "precautionary move," according to U.S. spokesmen. Evacuation of dependents and some said the atmosphere in Pakse was "charged" and some said it "bordered on panic."

American refugees, including Filipino, Thai, Vietnamese and Chinese employed by the American mission and contractors, say their hurried evacuation heightened tension in Pakse.

Certainly the Laotians were scared and wanted to go, said a Filipino housewife "but there was nowhere for them to go."

They [the Laotians] stood around confused when we packed our things and children tears for the airport," said a Filipino.

In the east of Pakse in Pakse, called the "Key to the Bolovens" because of its location on the strategic Highway 23, 10 residents remain behind new lines created by the

North Vietnamese push. Their presence has hampered fighting in the area, according to informed sources.

The situation in Pakse is described by knowledgeable sources as "quite worrisome at best," and confused because there is no readily identifiable center of command.

Observers flying over the Bolovens reported that a house search of Paksong was conducted by the North Vietnamese as they occupied it.

Operation Brotherhood, a Filipino hospital group, reported a number of their Lao personnel and most patients remained in Paksong, twenty miles south of Pakse, with two battalions of Cambodian irregulars receiving training in guerrilla warfare under CIA program are reported

moled and not expected to engage in combat because their officers are on leave in Vientiane.

North of Paksong an estimated two companies, and possibly a battalion of Thai soldiers, are reported to be in the defense of Pakse. American officials called for evacuation of dependents as a "precautionary move," according to U.S. spokesmen. Evacuation of dependents and some said the atmosphere in Pakse was "charged" and some said it "bordered on panic."

Air observers report that the North Vietnamese force is moving toward the remaining government position on the Bolovens Plateau near Pakse.

ENEMY OVERRUNS A 2D TOWN IN LAOS

75% of Dong Hene Reported
Destroyed 2 Days After
Fall of Plateau Center

By HENRY KAMM

Special to The New York Times

VIENTIANE, Laos, May 18—

Government forces suffered a new blow in the southern panhandle of Laos today as North Vietnamese troops, attacking behind a heavy rocket barrage, overran the town of Dong Hene.

Seventy-five per cent of the town was reported destroyed by the barrage. Military sources reported sighting 10 Soviet-made PT-76 tanks on Route 9 about five miles east of Dong Hene.

Laotian officials continue to express hope that the North Vietnamese have no interest in seizing major Laotian towns. But they concede at the same time that the fall of Paksong on the Boloven Plateau two days ago and of Dong Hene today poses a direct menace to the two principal towns of the panhandle—Pakse and Savannakhet.

The United States has an Agency for International Development mission in Pakse, which is near the Boloven Plateau in southernmost Laos.

With North Vietnamese forces

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reported only 25 miles from Pakse, 50 American dependents and 50 other foreigners were evacuated by air to Vientiane, The Associated Press said. A United States Embassy spokesman in Vientiane said 100 working Americans remained behind in Pakse.

There also are Americans working in Savannakhet, which is on the Mekong River, about 125 air miles northwest of Pakse.

Only a stretch of flat brushland lies between the North Vietnamese at Dong Hene and Savannakhet. The two towns are 35 miles apart.

Dong Hene was the headquarters of forward elements of Laotian Government troops on Route 9, the strategic road that cuts across the panhandle from the Thai border along the Mekong to the South Vietnam-

ese border on the east. The town is about 70 miles west of Tchepone, scene of heavy fighting in March during the American-supported South Vietnamese thrust into Laos.

Defensive Positions Cited

Only yesterday, highly placed Laotian military sources spoke confidently of the success of the Government forces in setting up defensive positions midway between Dong Hene and Muong Phalane, a town captured by Communist forces early this year.

Dong Hene, a sizable town built around the former officers' training school of the Laotian Army, was first attacked in early morning darkness, but then the North Vietnamese eased pressure for a time. They launched a ground attack at the first light of day.

The attack was repulsed, and the rocket barrage followed. The defenders were reported to have abandoned Dong Hene around noon. [According to The Associated Press, North Vietnamese troops reportedly ambushed a Laotian military convoy as it was retreating westward to Seno, 20 miles away.]

Much of the civilian population was believed to have fled westward on Route 9 before today's attack. The civilians left in recent days, it was said, as enemy harassment mounted.



The New York Times May 19, 1971

Fall of Dong Hene (1) was said to pose threat to Savannakhet (2). U.S. dependents in Pakse (2) were evacuated by air.

North Vietnamese Capture Key Laos Town Near Trail

By HENRY KAMM
Special to The New York Times

VIENTIANE, Laos, May 17—supplies are carried from North Vietnam into Cambodia and South Vietnam. The Laotian command announced today that the North Vietnamese had taken the last important Government position on the Boloven Plateau, the strategic high ground in the southern panhandle.

The Bolovens Plateau had been a principal base area for the surveillance and harassment operations carried out against the Ho Chi Minh Trail by guerrilla units financed by the Central Intelligence Agency.

In effect, the Laotian sources said, the high ground has become part of the trail, which is a network of roads along which

While maintaining that the Government still holds one position, at Houei Kong, Laotian military sources conceded privately that the loss of the town of Paksong and the nearby fortified position of Ban Houei Sai gives the North Vietnamese all but complete control over the plateau.

Informed American sources reported later that the position at Houei Kong came under heavy attack this noon.

Foe Searches Home

Brig. Gen. Thongpanh Knoksy announced today that Government troops evacuated Paksong, a town of about 8,000 people, and Ban Houei Sai yesterday afternoon after fierce hand-to-hand combat with the North Vietnamese.

Unofficial reports from military sources said that the Laotians had lost at least 50 men and large quantities of material. Three Government battalions were reported to have been involved in the battle.

General Thongpanh put the total of Communist troops in the region at eight battalions.

Government sources expressed a belief that the Vietnamese would not try to hold

Paksong, which is the most populous town on the plateau, and would not attack Pakse, the principal town of southern Laos, which lies 25 miles west of Paksong along Route 23.

American observation planes reported seeing North Vietnamese soldiers in new jungle fatigues conducting house-to-house searches in Paksong.

Late yesterday, observation planes spotted Communist troops blocking the highway less than 20 miles from Pakse. The number of Americans stationed in Pakse is estimated at more than 100. Many are accompanied by their families, but no evacuation plans have been announced.

Sissouk Na Champassak, the acting Defense Minister, returned to Vientiane this afternoon after a hurried trip to Pakse yesterday. Another visitor was the chief of the Central Intelligence Agency station in Laos.

No U. S. Troops Involved

No United States ground troops are involved in the fighting in Laos, but the fallen strongpoints depended on United States planes for their supplies and much of their fire support.

The loss of Paksong and Ban Houei Sai appears to leave the North Vietnamese free to use Laos as an approach route for troops and supplies going from North Vietnam to South Vietnam.

The North Vietnamese have been widening the Ho Chi Minh Trail network westward toward the Mekong River, both to sustain their operations in South Vietnam and to supply their troops in Cambodia.


Paksong is on Route 23, which begins north of here near the North Vietnamese border in the area of Tchepone. The provincial capital of Saravane fell to the North Vietnamese last year and if they can hold Paksong they will be able to use the road as far as that point as the westernmost branch of the trail network.

Foe Reported Advancing

VIENTIANE May 17 (Agence France-Presse) — North Vietnamese troops were today reported advancing in force toward Houei Kong, the Government's one remaining stronghold on the Boloven Plateau, 20 miles southeast of Paksong. Three battalions of special forces recruited by the United States are stationed in the area, which now appears isolated, according to reports here.

B-52's Stage Raids

SAIGON, South Vietnam, May 17 (AP) — Only light ground action was reported in South Vietnam today. United States B-52 bombers again made raids in Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam.



The New York Times May 17, 1971
Paksong was last major town on plateau to fall.

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